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ALD-162        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-4622 
 ___________ 
 
 TYRONE WHITE, 
        Appellant 
 v. 
 
 PLANNED SECURITY SERVICES; 
DINO IULIANO; CARL STOFFER, regional manager; 
CARLOS BROWN, site manager; RODNEY JONES, site manager; 
ASHTON JONES, concierge; MARY GALGON, property manager 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-02017) 
 District Judge:  Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to  
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 19, 2012 
 Before:  SLOVITER, FISHER and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
 
  (Opinion filed: May 3, 2012) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Appellant Tyrone White, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court‟s 
order granting the defendants‟ motion for summary judgment.  Because the appeal does 
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not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d 
Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
I. 
 In May 2010, White, an African-American male, filed in the District Court a 
complaint alleging that his former employer, Planned Security Services (“PSS”), 
unlawfully discriminated and retaliated against him because of his gender, age, and race, 
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and 
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 951 et seq.   
 As explained in the defendants‟ undisputed statement of material facts, PSS 
contracts to provide safety and security services for commercial and residential facilities, 
including The Arts Condominium, a residential building in Philadelphia.  White joined 
PSS as a concierge at The Arts in 2006.  He was supervised by defendant Carlos Brown, 
an African-American male. 
 During his shifts, White often worked with Jeffrey Glencamp, an African-
American male with whom White did not get along.  On a number of occasions, residents 
of The Arts complained to White‟s supervisors about his arguments with Glencamp, as 
well as White‟s refusals to comply with residents‟ requests.  On June 14, 2008, White 
instigated a very loud argument with Glencamp while at work.  The following day, 
Brown removed White from the work schedule.  Although defendant Stoffer, a former 
PSS regional manager, offered to meet with White to discuss why he was removed from 
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the work schedule, White refused.  Thereafter, Stoffer, Brown, and defendant Mary 
Galgon, the former property manager, collectively decided to terminate White‟s 
employment with PSS effective June 28, 2011.  At the time of White‟s termination, PSS 
employed approximately 10 individuals at The Arts, all of whom were African-
American. 
 White alleged few facts in his complaint.  He alleged that Carlos Brown and Carl 
Stoffer, who is Caucasian, retaliated against him because he wanted to file a report 
against Brown for repeatedly borrowing money from people and failing to repay it.  
White further alleged that two PSS employees -- Ashley Jones and Jeanette Collier, both 
African-American women in their early 20s -- had significant tardiness records, but were 
not similarly terminated.  White also alleged that co-worker Ashton Jones was not 
disciplined, although White failed to explain why Jones should have been disciplined. 
 In his deposition, White elaborated that he believed he was wrongfully terminated 
despite having a perfect attendance record at work, and he speculated that he would not 
have received that treatment if he were younger, given that Ashley Jones and Jeanette 
Collier were not fired despite poor attendance records.  White also contended that 
Glencamp and his nephew were treated more favorably than he was, as they were 
permitted to work the same shift, despite the fact that Glencamp‟s nephew was ultimately 
fired by PSS.  White did not allege that Galgon or defendants Ashton Jones and Dino 
Iuliano retaliated or discriminated against him in any way. 
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 After the defendants completed discovery,1 they filed a motion for summary 
judgment, which the District Court granted.  White now appeals that decision. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We may summarily affirm if 
White does not raise a substantial question on appeal, see 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. 
I.O.P. 10.6, and we may affirm on any basis supported by the record.  See Hughes v. 
Long, 242 F.3d 121, 122 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001).  “Our review of a district court‟s grant of 
summary judgment is plenary, and we must apply the same standard the district court was 
required to apply under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56[].”  Spence v. ESAB Group, 
Inc., 623 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010).  “Thus, we can affirm only „if the pleadings, the 
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.‟”  Id. (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2)).   
 Title VII prohibits an employer from discharging an employee “because of such 
individual‟s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
As White lacks direct evidence of such discrimination, his claim falls under the burden-
shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S 792 (1973).  
Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of demonstrating a prima 
facie case of unlawful discrimination or retaliation.  See id. at 802.  This requires a 
plaintiff to show that (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was qualified for his 
                                                 
1
  White did not seek any discovery. 
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position; and (3) he was terminated under circumstances that give rise to an inference of 
unlawful discrimination.2  See Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410-411 (3d 
Cir. 1999).  If the plaintiff succeeds, the burden of production shifts to the employer to 
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.  See McDonnell 
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.  Once the employer meets this “relatively light burden,” 
Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994), the burden of production returns to 
the plaintiff, who can defeat summary judgment only by showing by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the employer‟s stated reason is pretextual.  See id.  Accordingly, once 
an employer has stated a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff must 
produce evidence that either “(1) casts sufficient doubt upon each of the legitimate 
reasons proffered by the defendant so that a factfinder could reasonably conclude that 
each reason was a fabrication; or (2) allows the factfinder to infer that discrimination was 
more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of” the termination.  Id. at 762.  
Because the ultimate issue is whether “discriminatory animus motivated the employer,” it 
is not enough to show that the employer made a “wrong or mistaken” decision.  Id. at 765 
(citations omitted).  Rather, the plaintiff must uncover “weaknesses, implausibilities, 
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions” in the employer's explanations that 
would permit a reasonable factfinder to believe that the employer did not actually act for 
                                                 
2
  Courts apply the McDonnell Douglas framework in evaluating claims arising under 
the ADEA and PHRA, as well.  See Wishkin v. Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 
2007) (ADEA); Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(PHRA). 
 
6 
 
its stated reasons.  Id. 
 In granting summary judgment, the District Court reasoned that (1) White failed to 
present any circumstances that gave rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination on the 
grounds of his age, race, or gender, and (2) even if White could make out a prima facie 
case of discrimination, he had not produced any evidence that cast doubt on the veracity 
of PSS‟s stated reasons for his termination.  We need not address whether White made 
out a prima facie of discrimination because we agree with the District Court that, even if 
he had done so, White failed to rebut PSS‟s stated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons 
for terminating his employment  -- i.e., his admitted public altercation with Glencamp 
and his failure to correct his behavior despite repeated warnings. 
 Further, the District Court correctly granted summary judgment on White‟s 
retaliation claim.  To prevail on a retaliation claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must show 
that “(1) [he] engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) the employer took an adverse 
employment action against [him]; and (3) there was a causal connection between [his] 
participation in the protected activity and the adverse employment action.”  Nelson v. 
Upsala Coll., 51 F.3d 383, 386 (3d Cir. 1995).  There is no evidence in the record, aside 
from White‟s bare allegation, that his termination resulted from his complaint that Carlos 
Brown borrowed money from colleagues without repaying it.  And to the extent that 
White‟s PHRA retaliation claim could be viewed as arising under the “public policy 
exception” to Pennsylvania‟s at-will employment doctrine, he has not identified any basis 
in Pennsylvania law to invoke that narrow exception.  See McLaughlin v. Gastrointestinal 
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Specialists, Inc., 750 A.2d 283, 287-89 (Pa. 2000) (employee‟s termination subsequent to 
making internal complaints to her employer did not implicate Pennsylvania‟s public 
policy concerns). 
 Accordingly, we will summarily affirm. 
 
